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ABSTRACT 
JEANINE NAVARRETE: From Refugees to Model Minorities: Cuban-Americans and 
the Media in Miami, 1960 – 1970.  
(Under the direction of Zaragosa Vargas) 
 
This thesis analyzes the emergence of competing ideological narratives about the 
Cuban community in Miami in the period from 1960 to 1970 in two major sources of 
print media, the Miami News and the Miami Herald, and nationally circulated periodicals 
ranging from the Saturday Evening Post to U.S. News & World Report. National 
periodicals reflected the public relations campaign undertaken by the Cuban Refugee 
Program and USIA, and printed celebratory stories about the economic and social 
assimilation of Cuban Americans that cast them as a “model minority” and counterpoint 
to the perceived breakdown of American values and the excesses of the Cold War 
establishment that culminated in the late 1960s. Conversely, in the Miami press, the 
growing Cuban exile community caused frequent panic about the city’s cyclically 
depressed economy, the labor unrest that exacerbated racial tensions, and the challenge 
posed to Anglo cultural and racial hegemony by non-English speakers. 
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I. Introduction: Race and Politics on the American Riviera 
 
Testifying before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees in December of 
1961, Dade County commissioner Arthur Patten warned that Miami residents “feared the 
changing complexion of the City of Miami.” Worse still, the “large influx of Cuban 
refugees presents a threat to the local balance of power, particularly if they are thinking 
of voting.”1 Patten’s testimony would prove to be uncannily prescient. Five years later in 
1966, the federal government passed the Cuban Adjustment Act, expediting the process 
of acquiring citizenship for refugees; in 1985 the citizens of Miami elected its first Cuban 
born mayor, its “complexion” irrevocably changed. The ascent of Cubans like Miami 
Mayor Xavier Suarez from refugees to policy makers in less than a generation is just one 
example of the many success stories that make up the larger origin myth of the Cuban 
community in Miami.  
The “Cuban success story” as it was touted in newspapers and magazines from 
the earliest days of exile is still invoked as a shorthand for explaining how Cubans 
singlehandedly transformed Miami from a sleepy resort town to the Gateway of the 
Americas while assimilating themselves to a set of traditional middle class American 
values that celebrated hard work, patriotism, and entrepreneurship. In her seminal essay 
“Ser de Aqui,” historian Nancy Mirabal challenges the “over riding interest in the Cuban 
Success Story” that for too long has informed the historiography of Cuban migration the 
                                                 
1
 U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommitee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and 
Escapees, Hearing, December 6, 7, 13, 1961, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.  
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United States.
2
 Mirabal does not explain how such a pervasive trope emerged or why it 
has remained popular both among Cuban Americans and the mainstream American 
public. This paper will show that the success of the Cuban exile community in Miami 
was more a product of the public relations campaigns of the Cuban Refugee Program and 
the federal government than it was an indication of the experiences of Cubans in Miami. 
A close study of local and national press coverage of Cuban refugees reveals that despite 
the triumphant editorials about Cuban middle class assimilation, the experiences of 
Cubans who settled in Miami in the first ten years of exile were characterized by limited 
occupational mobility, racial tension, and a struggle for political inclusion in Miami’s 
white power elite.
3
  
                                                 
2
 Nancy Raquel Mirabal. “‘Ser De Aqui’: Beyond the Cuban Exile Model,” Latino Studies 1, no. 3 (2003): 
p. 371.  
3
 There are few historical studies of the Cuban-American community in Miami; indeed, most academic 
works on the subject have come from the fields of sociology and political science. The most comprehensive 
historical monograph on the subject to date, Maria Christina Garcia’s Havana USA (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996) argues that Cubans in Miami were able to create a thriving ethnic enclave 
through a network of culturally specific clubs, organizations, and businesses that attempted to replicate 
aspects of pre-revolutionary culture and life in Cuba. Garcia’s work is ground breaking for its analysis of 
the development of specific cultural practices in exile, but focuses primarily on the experiences of middle 
and upper middle class exiles in the 60s, and only briefly touches on later waves of immigration in 1980 
and 1994. Despite this, nearly all subsequent studies on Miami, Cuban-Americans, or ethnic relations in 
South Florida, have referenced Garcia’s work. Felix Masud-Piloto’s From Welcomed Exile to Illegal 
Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995) offers a 
comprehensive history of the political and legislative factors that shaped each subsequent wave of post-
revolutionary Cuban immigration, but does not consider the experience of exile itself. More recently, 
historian Nancy Raquel Mirabal, in her essay “Ser De Aqui: Beyond the Cuban Exile Model” (Latino 
Studies 1.3, November 2003) has called for a reconsideration of Cuban immigration to the United States 
and an end to the “Miami monolith” that privileges post-revolutionary Cuban immigration and the myth of 
the Cuban success story over any other account of Cuban presence in the U.S. Despite Mirabal’s claim that 
the Cuban immigrant narrative is dominated by Miami, there are few compelling historical studies of the 
development of Miami or South Florida at all, even with the recent onslaught of “Sunbelt Studies” 
chronicling the political rise of the suburban South. One notable exception, Coming to Miami: A Social 
History (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2009) by labor historian, Melanie Shell-Weiss, chronicles 
the rise of Miami from a frontier town in the late 19th century to its rapid internationalization in early 21st 
century. Shell-Weiss characterizes Miami as the site of multiple overlapping migratory patterns and she 
examines how competing groups of migrants from within the United States and from the Caribbean and 
Latin America, have shaped the city’s development. Shell-Weiss provides a useful context to consider 
Miami’s Cuban-American enclave in respect to its interaction with other ethnic group as well as within a 
larger historical narrative of migration and transnational exchange in the region that spans nearly a century. 
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Although Commissioner Patten characterized Miami as only beginning to change, 
Miami had already been in a state of social and economic flux since World War II, and 
the city had been a hub of migration and tourism between the Caribbean and the United 
States since at least the early twentieth century. Yet modernity truly came to the city in 
the form of the U.S. Army’s use of Miami Beach as a training center for troops being 
deployed to Europe during WWII, and the city’s insular Southern social structure was 
slowly pried open by the presence of the federal government and the waves of GIs and 
then by other migrants who came to the city in the post-war years. In the immediate 
postwar period, two minority groups began to migrate in large numbers to the city: 
Jewish Americans and Puerto Ricans, whose experiences would in many ways, set the 
stage for the city’s handling of the Cuban refugee influx that started much later in 1960.  
Civic culture in Miami, like most cities of its size in the South, was dominated by 
a stalwart Protestant Anglo establishment, which faced the first challenge to its authority 
and its enforcement of white supremacy from the growth of Miami’s Jewish community 
in the years immediately following the war. Like Cubans a decade later, Jews first came 
to Miami as tourists, reveling in Miami Beach’s cottage industry of hotels and restaurants 
catering to Jewish tourists from New York and Chicago. Seeking an escape from the 
intergenerational constraints of northern urban neighborhoods, and lured by balmy 
weather and economic opportunity in Miami’s booming agricultural production and 
service/tourist economies, Jewish Americans migrated to the city in vast numbers. They 
followed a general migration pattern from the old industrial North to the booming 
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Sunbelt, settling predominantly in Miami and Los Angeles.
4
  As the city grew in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, Jews settled as permanent residents, opening businesses, schools, 
synagogues, and transforming the island of Miami Beach into a Jewish enclave. Jewish 
Americans who migrated to Miami were predominantly middle class and came to the city 
with significant financial and occupational resources, but the community nonetheless 
faced strong resistance with respect to participating in local politics. Miami was 
hegemonically Protestant; not even the city’s Catholic population was large enough to 
garner its own diocese until 1958.
5
 Although Jews were perceived as “white,” they faced 
discrimination in schools and in local politics, as well as violent anti-Semitic intimidation 
from the Ku Klux Klan and White Citizen’s Councils, including bombs and arson to 
synagogues and religious schools to maintain so as to white political power.   
The “Cuban problem” that Arthur Patten testified about was not the first time 
Miami had experienced an influx of Spanish speaking migrants. Between 1945 and 1953, 
the Puerto Rican community in Miami grew rapidly, as Puerto Rican men and women 
migrated to the city as part of Operación Manos a la Obra (Operation Bootstrap) and 
provided a steady labor source for the area’s agriculture and the city’s burgeoning 
garment manufacturing industries. Much like the reception of Cuban immigration, the 
Miami establishment initially welcomed the small number of wealthy Puerto Rican 
families who invested in the area buying large tracts of farmland and urban rental 
properties. However, as the demography of the Puerto Rican migration shifted with the 
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 For an extensive history of the Jewish community in Miami please see Deborah Dash Moore, To the 
Golden Cities: Pursuing the American Jewish Dream in Miami and L.A. (New York: The Free Press, 
1994), pp. 28-29.  
5
 Moore, To the Golden Cities, p. 26.  
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implementation of Operation Bootstrap and the Puerto Rican community became more 
widely comprised of working class laborers, the discourse reversed. Puerto Rican 
workers who joined the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) and the 
Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) were accused of rabble rousing and being 
involved in subversive communist activity. Puerto Ricans confounded Miami’s racial 
status quo by moving into areas that had previously been for blacks only, while white 
observers feared the “potentially explosive” effect of this new group in the maintenance 
of segregation by blurring traditional black/white racial distinctions.
6
  
Prior to the Puerto Rican migration, Miami’s racial makeup was starkly black and 
white. Although the city had a relatively smaller African-American population (14%) 
than most Southern cities of comparable size, Miami’s black population was growing in 
the post-war era. African Americans from other parts of the South were attracted by jobs 
in agricultural production, construction, and domestic jobs that supported the hotel 
industry.
7
 However, keeping Miami attractive to tourists and investment meant that the 
city government and Chamber of Commerce together did everything in their power to 
keep the city center reserved for high end service industries catering to tourists, and 
maintain segregation of public facilities, especially those catering to white tourists.
8
 
Ambitious urban planning projects operating under the auspices of slum clearance forced 
African Americans into the fringes of the city, to growing “colored towns” outside the 
                                                 
6
 Melanie Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami: A Social History, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2009), pp. 143-145. 
7
 For an in-depth account of Miami’s African American communities in the 20th century please see Nathan 
Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida 
(forthcoming, University of Chicago Press). 
8
 Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami, p.133.  
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city limits with few zoning protections, paved roads, or homes with indoor plumbing. 
African Americans in essence were forced to live in apartheid-like “all-Negro” zones 
outside the Greater Miami city limits. When Puerto-Rican farm and garment workers 
posed the first challenge to the city's traditional white/black hegemonic line in the late 
1940s, city government responded by segregating Puerto-Ricans into the neighborhoods 
abandoned by African-Americans, who in turn had been forced into the so-called 
“colored towns”.9  
Miami in the 1950s by all accounts was a city starkly divided by race. In the 
broader political context of McCarthyism and massive resistance to early civil rights 
legislation, the state government of Florida created the Florida Legislative Investigative 
Committee (FLIC) in 1956. FLIC (or the “Johns Committee” as it would be commonly 
known after its founder state Senator Charley Eugene Johns) was created to investigate 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Urban 
League for alleged criminal activity and political subversion.
10
 Over the nine years of its 
existence, however, the investigative reach of the state sponsored agency extended far 
beyond its original target. The committee investigated “homosexual teachers, indecent 
literature and pornography, liberal professors, and student peace and civil rights groups.” 
Any challenge to the postwar consensus on matters of race, gender, sexuality and 
patriarchy were suspect. Despite Dade County’s relative independence from state 
interference in local politics because of the enactment of a home rule amendment to the 
state constitution in 1954, the Johns Committee undertook several investigations in the 
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 Ibid, p. 149.  
10
 Stacey Braukman, Communists and Perverts under the Palms: The Johns Committee in Florida, 1956-
1965 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2012), p.3.  
 7 
 
county with the cooperation of local government into the suspected seditious activities of 
a variety of organizations, such as the American Jewish Congress, locals of the ILGWU, 
the Dade County chapters of the NAACP, and the Urban League.
11
  
State sponsored investigations were not the only source of anti-communist 
activism and massive resistance to civil rights in South Florida.  Referred to jokingly by 
journalists in Tallahassee as the “anteroom to fascism,” Dade County had one of the most 
active chapters of the John Birch Society outside of California. Founded in Belmont, 
Massachusetts in 1959 by former candy manufacturer Robert A. Welch Jr., the John 
Birch Society was a grassroots anticommunist activist organization. Birchers, as their 
members were known, believed that communism was rampant in the United States and 
that communist agents had manipulated the civil rights movement, infiltrated the National 
Council of Churches, and controlled the United Nations. Local chapters followed the 
central office’s directives and circulated ultra conservative periodicals, held educational 
seminars, engaged in letter writing campaigns and petition drives -- all intended to raise 
awareness of the imminent threat of communism in the United States.
12
 The Miami 
chapter of the organization boasted nearly half of the state’s membership and was active 
well into the mid 1960s.
13
  
As noted, Miami had long been a nexus of migration and travel from points north 
and south since it’s founding in 1896, and the city had developed a social and economic 
relationship with the Caribbean -- Cuba in particular -- beginning in the early twentieth 
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 Braukman, Communists and Perverts under the Palms, pp. 3-6. 
12
 Robert A. Goldberg, Grassroots Resistance: Social Movements in Twentieth Century America (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1991), p. 124. 
13
 Goldberg, Grassroots Resistance, p. 131.   
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century.  The city’s complex relationship with Cuba began around 1920 with the 
inaugural voyage of the first direct cruise service between Havana and Miami of the 
Havana American Steamship Corporation.
14
  Miami had long capitalized on its proximity 
to the Caribbean; selling itself to North American tourists as a subtropical and exotic 
destination with a Latin feel they could visit within American borders. Even much of 
Miami’s architecture was inspired by the Spanish colonial styles of the West Indies and 
Cuba, with Spanish street names to match. 
15
  Cuban tourists frequently visited Miami, 
and Cuba was likewise a very popular travel destination for Americans.  
Travel between Miami and Cuba grew exponentially in the late 1940s and 1950s. 
Enabled by proximity and by the expansion in flight service of Pan American and Cubana 
Airlines, and cheap hotel accommodations in the vacant summer months, a “semi-
permanent colony” of Cuban tourists became a fixture of the life and economy of 
Miami.
16
 In the off season, when the northern snowbirds returned to the Midwest 
heartland or New York, Miami’s economy was supplemented by middle class Cubans, 
making yearly or monthly trips to Miami to shop for consumer goods that were 
exorbitantly taxed in Cuba. They shopped in stores such as Burdine’s, Miami’s most 
elegant department store. Located in the middle of downtown Miami on Flagler Street, 
Burdine’s was beautifully decorated and known for its custom-made resort wear, its 
men's only “executive grille,” and an ice cream parlor popular with generations of 
                                                 
14
 For an in depth study of the cultural, social and economic relationship between Havana and Miami from 
the 1920s to 1959, please see Louis A. Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 432-444.  
15
 Pérez, On Becoming Cuban, p. 433. 
16 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 100. 
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Miami's privileged children for its Snow Princess ice cream dessert. Founded by a retired 
Confederate officer as an Indian trading post in 1898, it embodied Miami's 
transformation in just 50 years from a swampy frontier to a genteel resort area. As the 
Cuban economic and political climate took an even deeper downturn in the waning years 
of the regime of  Fulgencio Batista and a revolutionary insurrection fomented, many of 
the wealthy tourists who had been semi-permanent residents or even recreational visitors 
became permanent, purchasing homes and investing their savings in the comparative 
safety of American banks. Indeed, between 1955 and 1956 alone the number of 
immigrants from Cuba to South Florida went from 9,294 to 14,953.
17
  
Miami may have been primed for the mass migration of the early 1960s by its 
long relationship with Cuba and Cuban tourism, but as the drama of exile unfolded in the 
wake of the triumph of the revolution, the discourse about their place in Miami was 
irrevocably reversed as anger and resentment against Cubans developed. Miami 
comfortably capitalized on its Latin American appearance, and on Cuban tourists, but at 
its core it remained a city deeply stratified by racial and ethnic conflict. Although post-
revolutionary migrants joined existing Cuban communities in Tampa, New Jersey 
(Newark and Union City), New York City, and Chicago, the image of the Cuban exile in 
Miami -- clannish, loyal to the Spanish language and Cuban culture, politically unified, 
white, and economically successful had the greatest influence on mythologizing the 
Cuban success story.
18
 The notion of wholesale Cuban success is wrong for it assumes 
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 Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 
1959-1995 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), p. 16.  
18
 Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba's Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” International Migration Review, 
Vol. 19, issue 1 (Spring 1985), p. 19. Chris Girard and Guillermo Grenier, “Insulating an Ideology: The 
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that the Miami that Cubans entered in 1960, 1961, and 1962 was a vacuum that they 
dominated easily when clearly the reality was far more complex.  Economic and political 
mobility remained constrained to middle and upper class Cubans for much of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Meanwhile, the majority of Cuban Americans were working class, struggling 
for better wages and working conditions in Miami’s garment industry and service sector 
economies. Miami’s Anglo establishment threw down the gauntlet to the growing Cuban 
presence early on and negative stereotypes and fears of Cubans taking over Miami 
became firmly embedded in the local discourse. As a result, social integration with the 
Anglo community was limited and remains so to the present day.
19
 
Competing ideological narratives emerged about Miami’s Cuban immigrants in 
this period: a national narrative that celebrated Cuban assimilation and lamented the 
plight of refugees, and a local narrative in which Cubans were scapegoated for 
exacerbating unemployment and racial tensions in Miami. Utilizing a comparative 
framework, I will focus on two major sources of print media, local daily newspapers, the 
Miami News and the Miami Herald, and nationally circulated periodicals ranging from 
the Saturday Evening Post to U.S. News & World Report. Both sources reveal that 
interest in the “Cuban problem,” as referred to by the Miami Herald, was first due to a 
sudden increase in Cuban migration. Thus in 1961, 1965-66, and to a lesser extent from 
1969 to 1974, the number of stories printed about Cuban exiles corresponds directly to 
increases in immigration at several historical moments: immediately preceding the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Enclave Effect on South Florida’s Cuban Americans,” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 30 
(September 2008), pp. 530-543. 
19
  Susan Eckstein, “Cuban Émigrés and the American Dream,” Perspectives on Politics, No. 4 (June 
2006): p. 299. 
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breakdown of United States diplomatic relations with the new Castro government in 
1961; the beginning of the Camarioca boatlift in 1965; and intermittently during the 
steady immigration of the daily “Freedom Flights” that lasted between 1965 and 1974 
bringing a quarter of a million exiles to the U.S. In Miami, Cubans were often invisible to 
the local press, that is, unless they were arriving in large numbers. On a whole, the Cuban 
émigrés received less weekly press coverage than high school football.   
Secondly, comparison of these two narratives reveals the discontinuities between 
the nationally circulated periodical stories that reflected the public relations campaign 
undertaken by the Cuban Refugee Program and the United States Information Agency, 
and local coverage of the exile community by the major Miami newspapers. The national 
press consistently focused on triumphant stories that celebrated the economic and social 
assimilation of Cuban Americans that cast them in the narrative of the “model minority.” 
In the 1960s, their embrace of middle class American values of hard work and 
entrepreneurialism was presented as a counterpoint to the perceived breakdown of 
American values as the nation turned its attention to racial inequalities and the excesses 
of the Cold War establishment, namely the unwinnable war in Vietnam. The local press 
in Miami presented a radically different reality. In Miami, the growing Cuban exile 
community caused frequent panic regarding the city’s cyclically depressed economy, the 
labor unrest that exacerbated racial tensions, and the challenge they posed to 
unquestioned Anglo cultural hegemony by non-English speakers. The full vehement 
backlash against Cubans would not come until the 1980s in the wake of the Mariel 
boatlift that brought the sudden influx of 125,000 Cubans to the city. Its roots, however, 
were established two decades earlier in how the Anglo-dominated press dealt with the 
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first two waves of respectable Cuban exiles. This long lasting, unresolved inequality and 
conflict between Miami’s Cuban and Anglo communities had its origins in this early 
period.
  
 
 
 
 
II. “A National Opportunity”: Anti-communism and the Politics of Loyalty 
 
 Miami at midcentury had come to be known in Florida as a particularly repressive 
municipality in which the city government wielded a combination of “anticommunism, 
racism, and corruption” to uphold the power and profits of the white establishment.20 
Despite the city’s comfortable economic partnership and its embrace of virulent 
anticommunism, the backlash was swift against the Cuban refugees (no longer coveted 
middle class tourists) who began arriving in large numbers in 1960. In the first two years 
following the Cuban revolution, the American government had a relatively relaxed 
immigration policy that allowed Cubans to enter the United States through the normal 
consular channels through commercial flights. During this period approximately 125,000 
Cubans arrived in the United States, with between 40,000 and 90,000 Cubans settling in 
Florida. This comparatively lax approach to immigration policy can be attributed to the 
long history of political affinity and geographic proximity between the two nations, but 
more importantly to the extensive involvement of the U.S. government and the Central 
Intelligence Agency in organizing counterrevolutionary guerilla movements in Cuba with 
exiles. Additionally, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations both persisted in 
characterizing fleeing Cubans not as immigrants but as exiles, who entered the United 
States only temporarily and were united in a common goal of returning to Cuba as 
quickly as possible. Although much of Cuba’s professional class arrived in this first wave 
of exiles, most arrived in Miami with few resources or cash, and without relatives or 
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 Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami, p. 150.  
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business contacts to support themselves and all were ineligible for the scant social service 
benefits available through Dade County or the state of Florida. There were few job 
opportunities as unemployment in Florida hovered near 7%, higher than the national 
average, and affordable housing was in short supply. The Dade County school system 
and local charitable organizations were ill prepared to deal with the influx of nearly 500 
to 1000 immigrants who arrived in Miami weekly during this time.
21
  
Not surprisingly, immediately following the 1959 Cuban revolution the 
Eisenhower administration began to receive complaints from Florida’s congressional 
delegation about the stress the influx Cuban refugees placed on schools and public 
services. In November 1960, Eisenhower dispatched Tracy Voorhees, the New York 
lawyer and former chairman of the President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, 
to Miami to assess the extent of the refugee problem. Shortly thereafter the Cuban 
Refugee Emergency Center was opened and although much of the relief burden still fell 
to the Centro Hispano Católico and the Protestant Latin Refugee Center, these 
organizations could not adequately service the accelerating diaspora alone. In January 
1961, newly inaugurated President John F. Kennedy established the Cuban Refugee 
Program (hereafter referred to as the CRP) via the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to provide welfare services and resettlement programs to Cubans entering the 
United States. Kennedy remained committed to the CRP. The program aligned well with 
his interest in extending anti-communist foreign policy throughout Latin America, and 
his political identity as an anticommunist Cold Warrior committed to counterinsurgency. 
His personal identity as the descendant of immigrants that he expounded upon in his 
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 Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half Open Door (New 
York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 61- 63. 
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classic essay Nation of Immigrants was also a factor in his call for immigration reform. 
Kennedy controlled foreign policy through the White House and remained directly 
involved in Cuban exile political activities and the oversight of the CRP for the duration 
of his presidency.
22
   
 The Cuban Refugee Program encompassed welfare services, job training, health 
services, and an extensive public relations program to build support for Cuban 
resettlement and affirm the “American commitment to refugees.”23 The CRP undertook 
this charge by mobilizing an extensive public relations campaign that targeted 
newspapers, radio, magazines and trade journals, in addition to providing press releases 
to state governments that would hopefully encourage resettlement opportunities. These 
early publicity campaigns stressed the identity of Cubans as victims of the tyranny of 
communism, as well as a politically unified group that was overwhelmingly committed to 
fighting communism in Cuba.  
Interest in the Cuban revolutionary cause had been a mainstay of the American 
press since at least 1957. Despite the shift in governmental discourse in 1960-61 about 
Cuba because of conflicts between the new revolutionary government and American 
business interests on the island, there remained a persistent interest in Cuba from the New 
Left, and black freedom movement activists that the CRP and the USIA sought to 
                                                 
22
 For further discussion of the Cuban Refugee Program and similar initiatives see Maria Cristina Garcia, 
Havana, USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in Miami, 1959-1994 (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1994), pp. 20-21; Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants, pp. 49-50; 
Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2004), pp. 240, 249.  
23
 Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 121. 
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counterbalance.
24
  Within the budding New Left, the Socialist Workers’ Party helped 
found the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which peaked in popularity immediately prior 
to the Bay of Pigs confrontation. The organization made Cuba the political cause of 
choice on American college campuses and attracted thousands of supporters to protests 
denouncing the American supported Bay of Pigs invasion. Fair Play for Cuba organized 
trips to the island to offer Americans an opportunity to witness the triumph of the 
Revolution firsthand. Cuba also became a subject of interest to black nationalist political 
activists, such as Harold Cruse, LeRoi Jones (Amiri Baraka), John Henrik Clarke, and 
Robert F. Williams. Williams in particular wrote positively and extensively about the 
Cuban revolution in the Crusader. Through his connections to the Socialist Workers 
Party and Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Williams led an African American delegation to 
Cuba in 1960, and wrote and lectured extensively on the “sense of freedom” from racial 
injustice he experienced on the trip.
25
 But as the New Left became more politically 
radical and their foreign policy interests shifted from Cuba to Vietnam, their perspective 
on Cuba was replaced with the federal government’s more hegemonic anti-Castro, anti-
communist frame that shaped coverage of the exile community in Miami. Likewise, the 
Black Power, Chicano, and Puerto Rican movements also became more radicalized by 
the Third World liberation struggles taking place in the Americas, Southeast Asia, and 
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 Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p. 222. See also, Diane Carol Fujino, Heartbeat of Struggle: The 
Revolutionary Life of Yori Kochiyama (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 168; Peniel 
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Africa, and their views became less and less a part of the mainstream political discourse 
on Cuba.  
Thus this shift in national discourse provided the space for the CRP’s 
counternarrative of assimilated middle class Cuban identity to emerge in the national 
press. The stories of Cuban assimilation that began appearing in Reader’s Digest, 
Newsweek, Time, and other national periodicals marked a turning point in the previous 
mainstream coverage of the Cuban Revolution. Paralleling the diplomatic break with 
Cuba, stories about Cuban exiles fleeing the revolutionary government were markedly 
different from prior news coverage. Cuba itself receded from attention as periodicals 
focused on the success narratives of Cuban exile assimilation unfolding on American 
soil. Preoccupation with exile stories reveal the extent to which the United States 
Information Agency (USIA), headed by prominent news commentator Edward Murrow 
from 1960 to 1964 under the auspices of the CRP, created a counternarrative to the years 
of breathless and supportive coverage of the 26
th
 of July Movement and Fidel Castro as 
its charismatic rebel leader.
26
 
 The extensive publicity campaign orchestrated by the CRP included 4,000 
mailings sent to daily newspapers and syndicated columnists, public relations firms, and 
scripts of questions for politicians sent to TV and radio broadcasters. Relying on broad 
generalizations, these stories ignored the complexities of the political and social situation 
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in Cuba and, more importantly, the complex personal histories of the Cubans arriving in 
the United States, many of whom had been initially supportive of Castro and the 26 Julio 
Movement. By focusing on dramatic tales of escape by sea and boat, the American reader 
was left to conclude that all Cubans who came to the United States were victims of 
communist repression and violence and therefore uniformly anticommunist.
27
 As Maria 
de Los Angeles Torres argues, Cuban émigrés were politically incorporated into the 
United States for symbolic and political utility for national security interests. The Cuban 
exile community, she argues, became a willing and unwilling victim of the larger state 
policies of the U.S.
28
  A generalized political identity persists to this day; Cuban 
Americans are perceived as a monolithic group of right wing zealots despite evidence 
showing that the Cuban American voting bloc is more diverse, embracing a broad 
ideological spectrum ranging from dialogue with Cuba to support for civil rights and 
other social issues.  
 Echoing the politically unified, anticommunist stance presented in the 
CRP’s sponsored press releases and editorials, the Miami Herald nonetheless presented a 
more nuanced view of the complexities of exile politics. Starting with the first wave of 
exiles (1959-1960), the political views of Cuban exiles were the frequent subject of local 
press coverage. Usually appearing in tandem with a development in diplomatic relations 
between the U.S. and Cuba, the local press presented Cuban exiles as a politically 
fragmented group who were divided over a variety of political issues related to the “Cuba 
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question.” Anglo critics portrayed Cuban exiles as frequently squabbling among 
themselves over plans for governance on the island in the wake of Castro’s inevitable 
fall. In an early article, urban affairs columnist Juanita Greene for the Miami Herald 
portrayed this political fragmentation as detrimental to assimilation and creating an 
atmosphere of conspiratorial intrigue within the community: “There is no Cuban refugee 
community as such. There are hundreds of separate refugee units. Their dislike for each 
other is only exceeded by their hatred of Castro.”29 Greene, who would later testify on the 
Cuban exile situation before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1963, helpfully 
broke down the divisions within the community for observers into three major categories: 
“the Batista Group,” “former Castro supporters,” and “businessmen, professional 
men…and simple folk” or those who were not politically engaged or affiliated. Greene 
portrays each group in economic and political terms. Batista supporters came to the 
United States with money, Castro supporters left because “they couldn’t get their hands 
in the pork barrel,” and the acceptable and assimilable ‘simple folk’ left the island when 
their “finances” or “freedoms” were disturbed. Notwithstanding the rabid anti-
communism of the Miami city government prior to the arrival of the refugees, Anglos 
still viewed Cuban political activity with suspicion. The thought of groups of exiles 
“renting large houses” as meeting spaces for counterrevolutionary groups was almost as 
threatening as the thought of communism itself.
30
 The ideal refugee was one who fled 
Cuba as the innocent victim of state persecution and tried to assimilate to the national 
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melting pot by learning English and finding acceptable employment, rather than spending 
their days unemployed and rabble rousing.
31
  
National periodical coverage of Cubans in the workforce presents a remarkably 
different picture than the tense and hard scrabble world of Miami’s working class 
rendered in the Miami Herald and Miami News. Labor: where Cubans would work, 
which jobs they should fill, and how much they should be paid where often the foremost 
concerns for both working-class Anglo and black residents of Miami-Dade. This concern 
is reflected in local news coverage of the initial 1960 influx of refugee, of the 1965 
Camarioca boatlift, and the subsequent program of airlifts or freedom flights that lasted 
through the early 1970s. The labor question was also the driving force behind the move 
for enforced resettlement of Cuban refugees outside South Florida that eventually 
culminated in a federal resettlement initiative to augment the resettlement programs run 
by the Catholic Church and the International Rescue Committee.  
In many ways, the reception of Puerto Ricans in the 1940s by Floridians served as 
an early template for the first wave of Cubans likewise arriving penniless in the early 
1960s. Blue collar Anglos and blacks alike feared that this new desperate population of 
unskilled Spanish-speaking workers would be willing to work for lower wages and 
poorer conditions. “If it wasn’t for the Cubans, I could get a decent job;” Harry Howze, 
an Anglo taxi driver, indignantly complained to the Miami Herald in late 1960 in light of 
the swelling numbers of Cuban refugees.
32
 The institution of the Cuban Refugee Program 
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provided relief in the amount of $100 a month to unemployed or underemployed 
households who had limited or no assets.
33
 This only exacerbated Anglo and black fears 
that refugees were enjoying welfare benefits at the expense of local residents. Working 
class Miamians claimed that the implementation of these relatively paltry refugee 
benefits allowed exiles to work for less than minimum wage. These anxieties were not 
without basis in reality; in 1960 Miami was in the throes of an acute economic slump, 
and according to the Florida State Employment Office, approximately 20,500 “American 
born citizens” a week were seeking employment in the area.34  
 This early debate had damaging ramifications for the relationship between the 
black and emerging Cuban communities.
35
 Meanwhile, Anglo Miami seemed to care 
little if the nation’s immigration policies towards Cuban refugees were undermining 
black socioeconomic progress. In a Miami Herald article titled “Cubans Take Our Jobs, 
Negroes Claim,” Juanita Greene investigated the source of black “griping” about the 
rising rate of unemployment in the city’s black neighborhoods. Greene flippantly 
dismisses the complaints as based in “misinformation” and rumor that “circulates” 
through black neighborhoods.  Even when she conceded that occasionally Cubans were 
hired over African Americans for unskilled work, it was out of some displaced “quasi-
patriotic” reason since “they [Anglos] consider it a slap against Castro,” not racism.36 In 
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fact, the practice of hiring Cubans in positions once held by blacks was pervasive 
between 1961 and 1962 when the article was published, especially in the garment 
factories. The garment shops within the Miami city boundaries were being closed and 
reopened in the neighboring municipality of Hialeah where labor practices were less 
stringent. Black employees, who often held lower paying positions as pressers or cutters 
in the shops to begin with, were not invited to work in the newly re-opened non-
unionized shops; they were not even notified of the shop’s closure and relocation.37 Thus, 
in addition to the special attention paid by the federal authorities to Cubans, local labor 
practices increased tensions between blacks and Cubans in the first years of migration. 
Anglo employers and city politicians were dismissive of black concerns and capitalized 
on this rancor as they leveraged one vulnerable community against the other.  
The conflict over labor remained pervasive enough that the Miami Herald 
published a series of articles over the next two years that served only to clear the 
“misinformation” circulating about the work of the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center 
and the stipulations Cubans were required to adhere to in order to claim their refugee 
relief subsidy.
38
  City context plays an important role in how concerned local residents 
are about immigration. Miami’s newspress highlighted how the economic instability of 
the area shaped the treatment and reception of immigrants and spoke as well to the lack 
of public assistance for Miami-Dade’s residents. As Ms. Barefield of the Miami Welfare 
Planning Committee perceptively remarked in a 1961 interview with The Miami Herald, 
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“the whole community would have taken this situation better if our own needy were more 
adequately cared for.”39  
As the federal government stepped up federal aid for refugees via the Cuban 
Refugee Emergency Center, resentment regarding Cuban political activity cooled, and 
Cuban exiles were frequently polled for their predictions about the fate of the Castro 
regime. In the swirl of rumors and hearsay that preceded the botched Bay of Pigs exile 
invasion in 1961, the local press took exile political proclivities seriously. Two years 
after Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Santiago, Cuba, Dom Bonafede of the 
Miami Herald polled local “counterrevolutionary leaders” as to their predictions for how 
and when the Castro regime would fall. In an article dramatically titled “Blood to Drench 
Castro’s Fall, Foes Allege,” various well known exile leaders (including Orlando Bosch 
who would later be arrested for his involvement in terrorist plots against the Cuban 
government) predicted that Castro would not “last more than six months” before the 
country would be torn apart by a “civil war with great bloodshed” and a provisional 
government would be installed with the aid of the Organization of American States.
40
 
Featured prominently in the national section of the Miami Herald, this poll suggested that 
a segment of Miami Anglos valued the political savvy of the exile community and 
perceived them as being, at the very least, well informed about diplomatic relations with 
Cuba.  
The political value of Cuban exiles was not lost on Miami, and by 1961 it was 
evident that the city was beginning to take notice. This insider information became more 
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valuable and more publishable as the diplomatic crisis over the fate of Cuba unfolded. 
This poll published verbatim the quotes taken from various male exiles, and featured little 
commentary from the column’s bylined author. This is also an unusual early example of 
direct quotes from exiles. Columns by other writers often paraphrased or made more 
general references to exiles but rarely published quotes verbatim with a name, as 
Bomafede did in this example.  
 The first widely distributed national CRP editorial about Cuban refugees, 
“Refugees from Castroland” appeared in the Saturday Evening Post in 1962. Painting a 
picture of Cubans as “victims of Communism’s inhumanity to man,” the CRP 
emphasized the few Cubans who in this earlier wave hazarded the Florida Straits in small 
boats, despite the fact that the vast majority of Cubans arrived to Miami in the relative 
comfort of commercial flights.
41
 The process of registration and relocation was outlined 
in explicit detail, as if to reassure readers that there would not be a new and restless 
minority group swarming one of the most popular tourist destinations in the United 
States. The ideological weight of Cuban refugees was emphasized multiple times: “the 
way we treat Cuban refugees may be as important as anything we do in Latin America.”42 
The emphasis of the Cuban refugee crisis as a potential case study and opportunity for the 
United States to demonstrate its ideological superiority and to contribute to the fight 
against the spread of Leftist regimes in Latin America resonates throughout the national 
press coverage of this period. Although later articles focused on the economic success of 
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Cubans (as discussed in the next section), this success was depicted as a uniquely 
American brand of capitalist triumphalism.  
  An article in Newsweek titled “Iowa Sí!” published in 1963 establishes a similar 
narrative. Focusing on the resettlement of one Cuban family in Grinnell, Iowa, the short 
piece begins in Havana in the “dark and dank cell” of Vincent Rangel, and takes the 
reader on his journey to the wholesome cornfields of Iowa.
43
 Rangel escaped 
imprisonment in Cuba and was resettled through the CRP in Iowa to work as a high 
school Spanish teacher. He is portrayed as an example of the successful assimilation the 
CRP could provide. Like most national news stories in this early period, Newsweek 
emphasized refugees who had been successfully and “joyfully” resettled and who were 
well received by their communities. The town of Grinnell received the Rangels with open 
arms: providing community support and resources to help the Latino family 
accommodate to their new home.
44
 By emphasizing resettled Cubans, the CRP and the 
complicit national press redirected attention from the unfolding resistance to the growing 
Cuban population in South Florida and focused instead on how quietly and seamlessly 
Cubans fit into middle class American communities across the United States.   
Miamians were initially acquiescent about the influx of federal money following 
the official break of diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba in 1961. Their 
satisfaction with the federal and local government’s approach to the “Cuban problem” 
was short lived, however. In March 1963, a tense public meeting brought together U.S. 
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representatives Dante Fascell and Claude Pepper, Miami Mayor Robert King High, and a 
group of irate Miami residents. The crowd jeered and booed when Mayor High, who had 
been publicly supportive of the Cuban Refugee Program from its earliest inception, took 
the stage to defend the city’s role in supporting exiles and distributing aid. High was a 
divisive figure in Miami politics, known for his progressive views, support of civil rights, 
and boosterism for economic and commercial partnerships between Miami and Latin 
America. High even led an American delegation to Cuba that attempted to rehabilitate 
tourist relations between the United States and the Castro government in 1959.
45
 High 
pushed the crowd to be “proud” of the city’s good treatment of refugees.46  
While Robert King High, Dante Fascell, and Claude Pepper tried to push the 
positive spin on the refugee influx, all remarking that federal aid was a “two way street” 
that had pumped nearly 80 million dollars in federal aid into Miami’s depressed 
economy, the crowd remained indifferent. The attendees only clapped when State 
Attorney General Richard Gerstein stated that Cuban “Spanish speaking drivers” made 
up a disproportionate number of traffic citations. A similarly xenophobic reaction greeted 
County Manager Irving Macnayr’s accusation that refugees had cost the Dade County 
government nearly $500,000 in medical fees at Jackson Memorial Hospital alone.
47
 
Noticeably absent from the proceedings were representatives from the Cuban refugee 
community itself. Rep. Fascell and Rep. Pepper characterized the only solution to the 
problem as “resettlement and federal aid.” Fascell, Pepper and Mayor High were acutely 
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aware of the boon to the local economy that federal money piped through the city 
provided, as long as the Cuban Refugee Program required all incoming refugees to be 
processed through Miami in order to receive aid or employment placement. In coverage 
of this town hall hearing by Juanita Greene of the Miami Herald, the disparity in opinion 
between upper level local officials with national ties and the low level county officials 
and populace at large is apparent. Upper level officials seemed to be more sensitive to the 
financial benefits to Miami in its role as the site of such a well-funded and politically 
sound federal program. Officials more tied to the local community and a small local 
constituency, such as the county manager and commissioners, reflected the anger and 
anxiety of their constituents.  
Writing in 1965 in his weekly column in the Miami Herald, columnist Jack 
Roberts reflected on the accusation that exiles were taking advantage of the United States 
for the financial aid offered by the CRP instead of truly seeking political asylum. He 
admitted that “the majority of Cubans entering Miami have made good citizens [and] that 
they work hard and…have contributed to our economic prosperity.”48 However, the issue 
of economic versus political motivation colored Roberts characterization of Cubans. 
Those who entered the U.S. for political reasons were considered virtuous and worthy of 
aid and protection, but those Cubans who emigrated for purely economic reasons were 
suspect and less deserving of protection under America’s “bountiful economic umbrella.” 
Roberts’ opinions represented a subtle shift in the local news media’s perception of 
Cubans who arrived after the first waves of Cubans deemed more “respectable.” The 
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local press while generally accepting of the Camarioca refugees was nonetheless 
suspicious of their motives. Local logic followed that only Cubans seeking political 
freedom were worthy of economic prosperity.  The discourse on what compelled people 
to emigrate was certainly not new in the United States; indeed, starting with the passage 
of the amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1965, would shape the 
public discourse about Cuban immigration both within the Cuban community and in 
Miami. The later a Cuban exile came to the United States the more closely their 
motivations for leaving would be examined, and the more suspect their political loyalty to 
the U.S seemed to be.  
Anger over the presence of Cuban refugees in Miami resurged in 1965 when the 
Camarioca boatlift brought several thousand refugees into Miami in small boats and rafts. 
This followed Fidel Castro’s announcement that on October 10 any Cubans wishing to 
leave Cuban could do so from the Port of Camarioca. The port remained opened until it 
was closed on November 15 due to seasonal bad weather. In 1965, the Miami Herald ran 
a series of news editorials and stories that captured, on the one hand, the anger of 
Miamians at the prospect of more refugees, and, on the other, the pragmatic view of local 
officials and the Miami Herald editorial board that portrayed Miami’s acceptance of 
Cubans as patriotic and fulfilling the American commitment to the containment of 
communism in the Americas. Although the Miami Herald tried to strike a neutral tone in 
its editorial pieces, explicitly anti-Cuban pieces appeared frequently in the local section 
of the Metro edition as local sentiment shifted against the Cuban arrivals. Negative 
images continued plaguing the Cuban immigrant discourse, and Cubans continued to be 
targets of nativist suspicion.   
 29 
 
With widespread rumors of upwards of 150,000 refugees preparing to cross the 
Florida Straits destined for Key West, the Miami Herald published an article that voiced 
the worst fears of South Florida residents about the latest wave of Cuban entrants.
49
 On 
October 17, 1965, the Miami Herald published an article by reporter Sterling Slappey 
based on interviews with a group of women from the town of Marathon in the Florida 
Keys. Like previous articles that addressed the overall effects of massive exodus, the 
article captured the concerns of Floridians regarding jobs and welfare. The women 
angrily asserted that when a Cuban arrived on shore, “he asks where the welfare office 
is…you don’t hear him asking where the employment office is.” Another Marathon 
woman, apparently aware of the mounting resentment of Miami’s blacks who blamed 
Cubans for their unemployment plight, predicted a new round of “racial troubles” caused 
by Cubans who “when they do go to work, take over many of the jobs Negroes would 
have.” Irate Marathon residents seemed less willing to accept the Cold War rhetoric about 
providing shelter to those fleeing communist tyranny. Instead, they perceived the 
acceptance of refugees as “Castro…making fools of all of us, shoving all these people he 
wants to get rid of. Well, we don’t want them in Florida either.”50  
Public exasperation over the issue of Cuban refugees resulted in a growing 
sentiment that the matter was the responsibility of the federal government alone. The 
following day the Herald ran a less colorful editorial directed at the federal government 
with a set of eight “Guidelines for Refugees.” Echoing the testimony given by 
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Representative Dante B. Fascell before the House of Representatives earlier that week, 
the Miami Herald invoked patriotic identity -- that the United States should not treat 
Cuban refugees better than American citizens even if the refugee question was one 
“vested with the national interest” and that the federal government should act accordingly 
to ensure the protection of the citizens of Miami from the “burden” of another wave of 
exiles. The Miami Herald called repeatedly for assurance that Miami “should only be an 
entry and relocation point” and that the “rate of entry…should not exceed the rate of 
relocation.” Despite extensive evidence that Cubans in these early waves of immigration 
had few problems with law enforcement, the Miami Herald expressed fears of potential 
unrest. In addition to this airing of fears of Cuban refugees as a potential threat to 
Miami’s economy and culture the editorial board of the Miami Herald took the 
opportunity to imply that Cubans were criminals. Two of its eight points suggested that 
the government actively “security screen” refugees and provide “necessary and personnel 
and equipment…to enforce the laws and safeguard the security of the U.S.” 
Notwithstanding these references that played on the worst fears of Miamians, the 
newspaper concluded by reemphasizing the importance of providing refuge to Cubans so 
the United States could “remain firm in its determination to rid the Western Hemisphere 
of communism and to allow the people of Cuba to restore a democratic government.”51 
Invoking American notions of political loyalty seemed to be a losing proposition 
for Cubans in Miami. In the earliest years of exile their virulent opposition to the Castro 
regime was perceived as overwrought and extreme. As the prospect of returning to Cuba 
became less realistic, their political loyalty to the United States was questioned when they 
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accepted and later demanded jobs and relief assistance. Subsequent waves of exiles 
became subject to accusations of political disloyalty because they were perceived by 
South Floridians as emigrating for solely economic reasons, which were considered less 
virtuous than the motivations of their earlier counterparts, who were more politically 
engaged. 
In the improved racial climate made possible by the Civil Rights Movement, the 
passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 (Hart-Cellar Act) and then the 
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 fundamentally changed the legal residency and 
citizenship status of Cubans in Miami. The Hart-Cellar Act was a breakthrough piece of 
bipartisan legislation passed by the Johnson administration that intended to replace the 
1920s national origins quota system with a new unbiased immigration policy that would 
nonetheless still favor immigrants from Europe. Yet, the policy contributed to the arrival 
of nearly 23 million immigrants mainly from Latin America and Asia. They became the 
beneficiaries not only of American citizenship but of the also newly passed civil rights 
legislation that was intended to provide equal housing, employment, and other 
opportunities to recently enfranchised African Americans.
 52
 In many respects, Cubans 
were the first minority immigrant group in this nexus. This confluence of immigration 
and affirmative action has gone largely unnoticed by historians, but the effects on 
Miami’s Cuban community were felt almost immediately. 
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III.   From Refugees to Residents: Assimilation and Employment 
   
 
 In the second half of the 1960s, Cubans newly christened as Cuban Americans, 
remained the subject of interest and speculation by the American media. It now would 
characterize Cubans as a “model minority” and tout the Cuban community in Miami as 
embodying the promises of the Great Society. Federal assistance to Cubans was not as 
important in this narrative; rather, what was emphasized was the intrinsic “hardworking” 
nature of Cubans and their embrace of middle class American values. In Miami, the 
Cuban community remained subject to palpable anxiety about a racially segmented labor 
market, a declining tourist economy, and the confluence of affirmative action and 
citizenship. Despite stories of Cuban middle class assimilation, Cubans in Miami clearly 
remained culturally isolated and economically constrained. Stories of Cuban success only 
served to mask the issues that working class Cubans faced.  
Concerns over the effect of Cuban immigration on the Miami labor market once 
again surfaced as the number of migrants spiked in October 1965 with the beginnings of 
the Camarioca boatlift. Most outspoken were local labor and civil rights leaders. Edward 
Stephenson, head of the Dade County Federation of Labor in 1965, asked: “Will our 
working citizens find again that their jobs are being taken by outsiders willing to work for 
cut rate wages?”53 Dr. J.O. Brown, president of the Miami chapter of the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE), echoed Stephenson, claiming that Miami did not have sufficient 
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public or housing facilities for an estimated wave of 50,000 to 250,000 Cubans.
54
 
Tempering the preemptive outrage from labor and civil rights interests, editorials 
appeared in the Miami Herald and the Miami News that heralded the oncoming Cuban 
exodus as yet another episode in America’s great history of accepting immigrants fleeing 
oppression. Using the language first employed by the federal government in its public 
relations campaign on behalf of the CRP and the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, Bill 
Barry of the Miami News dismissed concern about immigration as the “great American 
fear” and the anxiety about job loss, and the invading Spanish speaking Cubans as “self-
righteous.”55 In the same edition, Miami News reporter Jack Roberts recounted an episode 
of Cuban militiamen harassing and firing on Cubans trying to flee via the boatlift exiting 
the Port of Camarioca. Roberts emphasized the hypocrisy and deceit of the Castro regime 
as justification for the growing exile presence in the United States. Roberts’ emphasized 
the larger political and symbolic values of the boatlift, a perspective that was largely 
absent in the generally more pragmatic local pieces that appeared in the Miami News.
56
  
 Two years after the Camarioca wave of exiles first arrived via boatlift the 
“Freedom Flights” commenced and lasted until 1973. The newcomers who spoke a 
different language sparked fear, hostility, and indignation about stressed social services 
and overtaxed local school systems. A call went out again to the federal government to 
deal with the mounting economic and social problems caused by Cuban refugees in 
Miami. Once again in October 1967, the Miami Herald editorial board implored the 
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federal government to renew its commitment to funding the CRP, “lest Washington 
forget our refugees.”57 The Herald juxtaposed the “obligation to liberty that must be paid 
by all people of this country” in committing to eradicating communism with Miami’s 
overtaxed county healthcare program at Jackson Memorial Hospital and the Dade County 
Schools that could barely keep up with the “new Cuban enrollment of 300 [students] a 
month.”  Local periodicals paid less and less lip service to the political idealism of the 
CRP, ultimately focusing on the troublesome aspects of dealing with a constantly 
growing refugee population that once more angered Miamians who thought the city was 
catering to Cubans at the expense of others.  
The presence of Cubans began to be felt almost immediately in the limited job 
market. Coverage of a Miami lobstermen’s strike in 1966 does much to reveal the 
tensions between Cubans and Anglos in South Florida’s working class communities that 
were largely absent or underrepresented by both local and national papers who preferred 
to focus coverage on Cubans in middle class occupations and professions.  The conflict 
initially arose between fisheries and independent lobster fishermen represented by the 
Florida Lobstermen’s Association (FLA), on the first day of the nine month spiny lobster 
fishing season, August 1, 1966. The FLA wanted to increase the standard price at which 
the fisheries purchased lobster from 40 cents to 50 cents a pound. Fisheries on the Miami 
River, especially the “Big 4” fisheries of Superior Fish Co., East Coast Seafood, Florida 
Caribbean Fisheries, and National Fisheries, who were the largest customers in South 
Florida, claimed they had a glut of off-season frozen lobster imported from Latin 
America which justified the lower wholesale price. The Florida Lobsterman’s 
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Association responded by calling for a grounding of all lobster boats between Miami and 
Key West.
58
 However, most of the rancor in the press coverage of the conflict was not 
directed at the fisheries who refused to purchase the local catch but rather at the Cuban 
lobster fishermen who did not participate in the strike and continued to sell their catch at 
40 cents. The perception of Cubans among Anglo South Floridians had become negative 
and a major point of this resentment was government-sponsored benefits for Cubans. 
“Walter Dietel of Hialeah, a fisherman for seven years, blamed the troubles on exile 
fisherman who can afford to sell for 40 cents a pound because, he said, they also receive 
government aid.”59 The striking fishermen also accused their exile counterparts of cutting 
the traps of rival lobstermen (the gravest sin in the spiny lobster industry) and having 
unregistered boats.  
Based on the available coverage of the strike in the Miami News, it seems that the 
Cuban fishermen were not represented by the Anglo dominated FLA. The establishment 
of the Association of Cuban Fishermen in the previous year to provide bargaining power 
and grants for improvement of equipment indicates that Cubans may have been barred 
from membership in the all Anglo FLA.
60
  Ultimately, the blame for driving down prices 
was on the fisheries that purchased imported lobster and purchased local lobster from 
unregistered boats. The Cuban fishermen became the scapegoats in a conflict caused by 
competition from imported seafood and exacerbated by an ethnically divided local 
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fishing industry. After a four day strike, the fishermen represented by the FLA, freelance 
Cuban fisherman, and fishermen in the Bahamas, reached an agreement and accepted the 
fifty cents per pound price, despite taking a nickel cut per pound from the previous 
season.
61
 
  Following the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966, a new crop of 
success stories about Cuban Americans abounded in national periodicals that depicted 
them not as victims of communist repression but as idealized models of the American 
Dream. A multipage story in Fortune Magazine published in October 1966 lauded 
“enlightened government policy” that had aided Cubans’ natural “energy, ability, and 
exemplary conduct” that allowed them to achieve almost instant middle class status in a 
matter of years or months.
62
 The article reflected a shift in national coverage of Cubans 
from a political asset to an economic asset. Cuban contributions to banking, 
manufacturing, and medicine became major themes that were repeated over and over in 
these interest stories. As the foreign policy headlines turned from the Caribbean to 
Southeast Asia with the expansion of American involvement in Vietnam, continued 
Cuban immigration was justified as an economic and political boon to the United States, 
as the U.S. government once more used the Cuban success story as a propaganda tool.  
Fortune Magazine emphasized the “amazing” economic mobility of Cubans, and 
their refusal to accept welfare despite admittedly being aided by federal programs that 
provided financial relief and job placement. However, all of the “amazing Cuban 
émigrés” that Fortune highlighted came to the United States from Cuba’s educated upper 
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and middle classes. For example, Eugene Ramos and David Egozi, the owners of the 
Suave Shoe Corporation showcased in several national articles about Miami’s Cuban 
exiles, smuggled $50,000 in capital from a prior business in Cuba and used it as startup 
capital for a business venture in Miami. 
63
 Fortune focused mostly on Cuban immigrants 
who had been successfully resettled, such as attorney Luis Padilla. Padilla had been a 
legal advisor to the Cuban government before emigrating to the United States. After 
washing dishes in a Miami restaurant, he and his wife were “reluctantly” resettled to St. 
Paul, Minnesota through the CRP.  Interviewed several years later while employed as a 
legal adviser to the 3M Corporation in St. Paul, Padilla remarked he “wouldn’t leave [St. 
Paul] for anything.”64  The Fortune article does not make any mention of working class 
Cubans, whether resettled or living in Miami. Nor did national news stories cover the 
experiences of working Cuban women. Fortune only mentions two, an upper class Cuban 
woman who became an interior designer after settling in New York, and a middle class 
woman who decided to take vocational courses in bookkeeping and became a clerk in a 
Boston insurance firm. However, the reader is reminded that traditional gender roles are 
still enforced within the immigrant community, even if some women did work: “Just as 
in Havana, her sister won’t let Pilar and her fiancé go out unaccompanied.”65 In general, 
nationally circulated stories about Cubans reinforced the themes of traditional family 
values, industriousness, assimilation, and middle class achievement that the CRP 
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originally highlighted in its public relations campaign in 1961 and 1962 for Cuban 
resettlement. 
 In 1971, an editorial in Business Week joined the chorus celebrating Miami’s new 
“affluent middle class” of Cubans and their “innumerable” rags-to-riches stories, 
confirming their meteoric rise up the economic ladder faster than any other American 
ethnic groups. “Almost overnight they have emerged from the deprived refugee state and 
moved in the middle class, skipping lightly over – or never even touching – the lowest 
rung of the economic ladder that was the necessary first step for the Irish, the Jews, the 
Italians, and others.”66 Surprisingly however, the article devotes significant space to 
discussing the economic tension between African Americans and Cubans in Miami. 
Business Week characterized the two groups as vying for the resources and favor of the 
Anglo city government and county commission, rather than being in direct confrontation. 
Robert Sims, the county community relations director and informal spokesman for 
Miami’s black community compared the problem of persistent black poverty and 
unemployment in Miami to that of an “underdeveloped nation...looking to the developed 
nation, in this instance the white people, for help.”67 Sims added that “Cubans have 
received a greater response.” Miami Mayor Stephen Clark was markedly ambivalent in 
his comments about tensions between the two communities and insisted that problems 
were being “created by certain elements,” but that if there was going to be a problem it 
would have happened “eight years ago” in the wake of the first arrivals.  
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The Business Week article was unusually perceptive in presenting a city that while 
extolling itself as a model of assimilation and ethnic alliances was actually deeply 
segregated. The lack of engagement with the issue of racial tension and inequity by city 
officials, while certainly not as explicitly racist as the urban planning initiatives of their 
early 1950s predecessors, nonetheless indicates a policy of benign neglect, in which the 
African American community with few resources or political power was largely ignored, 
while the Cubans, newly ascendant because of their enfranchisement in 1966 and 
federally funded through CRP programs, became a politically desirous voting bloc 
courted by elected officials.  
Maintaining the narrative that appeared in many periodicals, a 1971 editorial in 
U.S. News and World Report excluded the issue of racial tensions caused by employment 
in Miami. Instead, the article celebrated the professional accomplishments of Cuban 
American doctors, lawyers, and bankers like Carlos Arboleya, (who appeared in several 
of these special interest stories in the late 1960s and early 1970s) president of Fidelity 
National Bank in South Miami. The article emphasized that Cubans had been “scattered 
widely” and despite their high concentration in South Florida the area has greatly 
benefited from this “bilingual pool of talent.”68 The themes of cultural and economic 
assimilation were underscored – Cubans have done well because of “a lack of rapport 
with other Spanish speaking persons...the Cubans seem to identify more with the 
'Anglos.'”69 
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National magazine and newspaper pieces about the Cuban entrance into the 
American middle class achieved only a few short years after emigration belie the stark 
reality of Cuban economic mobility in the 1960s and 1970s. Two studies by Florida 
International University economists Raul Moncarz and Antonio Jorge, in 1978 and 1987, 
found that when occupational data collected by a University of Miami survey of 
incoming Cuban refugees in 1966 was compared to data collected by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce through 1980, there was "no indication of significant upward 
movement in occupational status at the group level since 1959."
70
 Overall, these two 
Cuban-American economists found that the occupational status of the majority of the 
Cuban community remained stubbornly "bipolar" during this twenty year period. 
Twenty-two percent of the group was concentrated in administrative, managerial, and 
professional positions, while the next occupational group was larger totaling forty-five 
percent of the population and was comprised of service workers and operative laborers.
71
 
Thus, only a small percentage of Cubans were able to maintain their professional 
occupational status as the rest of the Cuban community in Miami fell into the ranks of 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, a status that was below the skill and prestige of 
occupations many had held in Cuba. Far from the "innumerable rags to riches stories" 
celebrated by Business Week and Fortune, the stagnant economic and occupational 
mobility of Cubans in Miami during this period represented a significant loss of human 
capital and skilled labor for the community. Like Nancy Mirabal, Moncarz and Jorge 
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indict the exaltation of Cuban success stories of individuals like David Egozi and Carlos 
Arboleya as the reason for the misperception of Cubans as a uniformly affluent minority 
group. 
  
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
   The narrative of Cuban American identity presented by the national press -- that 
ignored the economic and social conditions of the majority of Cubans in Miami during 
this period -- reveals the extent to which the federal government’s portrayal of Cubans as 
middle class and politically unified was an artificial construction. The Cuban success 
stories touted by the Cuban Refugee Program became staples of the Cuban refugee 
experience in America. They were political tool that made the financial support and 
political acceptance of the Cuban exile community palatable to the average American by 
adopting a “just like us” narrative that celebrated Cubans as patriotic, hardworking, and 
family oriented. Cuban refugees also served the foreign policy goals of the United States 
between the years 1960 and 1965, and the “Cuban success story” was oriented towards a 
vast Cold War political discourse that celebrated the triumph of American capitalism and 
attempted to undermine the Cuban revolution by actively destabilizing it. Cuban émigrés 
served an important symbolic function in legitimizing American Cold War foreign 
policy. After the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 and the shift of Cold War 
political discourse to Southeast Asia, the “Cuban success story” took on a more economic 
slant that revered Cuban contributions to American business and commerce in spite of a 
climate of economic downturn, urban decline, and deindustrialization.  
The artificiality of this narrative becomes stark in comparison to the coverage by 
the local Miami press of the Cuban community in the same period. The Cuban 
community became a flashpoint for controversies over political loyalty, racial 
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assimilation, union decline, urban poverty and unemployment. In Miami’s service and 
light manufacturing economy, Cubans became the new source of cheap, mobile and 
easily manipulated labor for Anglo business owners. It provided employers the dual 
benefit of preventing blacks from accessing jobs in integrated workplaces while allowing 
the employer to justify their hiring practices as emanating from a deep anti-communist 
patriotic sentiment. The overall economic status of Miami’s Cuban community remained 
static for the entirety of the 1960s. A small percentage of  Cuban professionals and 
business people did find success, but the majority of Cuban refugees toiled in working 
class service and light manufacturing positions, often below the occupational status they 
held in Cuba.  
Careful consideration of the origins of the Cuban American success story forces 
us to reconsider their position within the historiography of Latino migration to the United 
States. The assumption that Cubans were somehow a model minority because their 
upward mobility was impressive, relative to the dire economic and social stagnation of 
the African American and Puerto Rican communities in Miami and the Latino 
community in the U.S. as a whole obscures the experiences of working class and laboring 
Cubans, who continue to comprise the majority of the community. The model minority 
tag has also isolated Cubans from other minority groups, and prevented the creation of 
long standing ethnic alliances in Miami. The relative upward mobility of Cubans, which 
can be at least partially attributed to the largesse of the federally funded CRP, did not 
endear them to the Anglo power structure in Miami, either. Thus at the end of the 1960s, 
Cuban Americans were frequently caught in the middle of an emerging racial and social 
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hierarchy that emerged in Miami, with Cubans as a buffer group between Anglos and 
African Americans and unable to truly assimilate with either.  
Yet despite the obvious discontinuity between the federal government’s fictive 
Cuban experience and the real Cuban experience in Miami, it is not immediately clear 
why the Cuban success story has remained such a pervasive myth, even to the present 
day. This is an area that requires further study. One can speculate that Cubans quickly 
realized that their special state-sponsored status afforded them a level of privilege that 
none of Miami’s other maligned minority groups were given (much to the chagrin of the 
white power elite). Cubans internalized and promulgated the master success narrative as a 
survival strategy that facilitated a shared sense of purpose and culture in an immigrant 
community that was actually quite politically, socioeconomically, and racially diverse.  
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